Default VM Templates Enable Infrastructure That Blends Into Legitimate Hosting
Sophos researchers have identified multiple ransomware and malware operations using virtual machines provisioned through ISPsystem to distribute malicious payloads and maintain command-and-control infrastructure.
For organizations with complex cloud, SaaS, or third-party dependencies, this technique exposes a critical limitation, allowing infrastructure to appear clean on paper while still being actively used to host or deliver malicious payloads.
How ISPsystem VMs Are Being Abused
During an investigation into recent WantToCry ransomware incidents, Sophos researchers noticed that multiple Windows-based virtual machines shared identical hostnames. This strongly suggested they were deployed from the same default templates used by ISPsystem’s VMmanager platform.
Upon further analysis, they found the same hostnames across infrastructure linked to multiple ransomware and malware operations, including:
- LockBit
- Qilin
- Conti
- BlackCat/ALPHV
- Ursnif
- RedLine infostealer campaigns.
- Lummar infostealer campaigns.
ISPsystem is a legitimate software vendor whose products are widely used by hosting providers to manage virtual servers, operating systems, and infrastructure lifecycle tasks. VMmanager, their virtualization platform, allows providers to rapidly spin up Windows or Linux VMs for customers.
What Sophos identified was not malicious intent, but a design weakness in default Windows templates that reused the same hostnames and system identifiers each time a new virtual machine was deployed. This creates a consistent infrastructure fingerprint that could be replicated at scale across unrelated environments.
Why This Works So Well for Threat Actors
Bulletproof hosting providers, operators that knowingly support cybercrime and ignore takedown requests, have taken advantage of this behavior. By deploying large numbers of VMs using VMmanager’s default templates, attackers can:
- Blend malicious systems among thousands of legitimate virtual machines.
- Complicate attribution by reusing identical hostnames across unrelated campaigns.
- Delay or avoid infrastructure takedowns.
- Rapidly rebuild command-and-control environments when systems are disrupted.
Sophos found that most of the malicious activity traced back to a small cluster of hosting providers with poor reputations or existing sanctions, including Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., Zomro B.V., First Server Limited, Partner Hosting LTD, and JSC IOT.
Researchers also identified a provider with direct control over physical infrastructure, MasterRDP, which uses VMmanager while offering VPS and RDP services that do not comply with legal takedown requests.
The Hostnames Behind the Activity
Sophos found that a small set of default Windows hostnames accounted for more than 95% of all internet-facing ISPsystem virtual machines observed, including:
- WIN-LIVFRVQFMKO
- WIN-BS656MOF35Q
- WIN-344VU98D3RU
- WIN-J9D866ESIJ2
Each of these identifiers appeared in customer detection or telemetry data directly tied to ransomware and malware activity.
This level of hostname reuse significantly complicates infrastructure fingerprinting and takedown efforts. A single identifier can represent thousands of virtual machines across multiple providers, blending malicious systems among large volumes of legitimate infrastructure, where traditional indicators provide little to no signal.
Sophos notes that platforms like ISPsystem’s VMmanager are attractive to cybercriminals not because they are inherently insecure, but because they offer low cost, a low barrier to entry, and turnkey deployment with minimal customization required. These same characteristics are common across modern cloud and hosting environments.
What This Means for Security Teams
Following the publication of Sophos’ findings, ISPsystem confirmed that it has updated its Windows VM templates to randomize hostname assignment, eliminating the specific identifier reuse observed in the report.
While this change addresses the immediate technical issue, it does not remove the broader risk highlighted by this activity. When attackers can hide payload delivery and command-and-control systems inside legitimate hosting environments, security teams must focus on:
- Continuous visibility into outbound connections and hosting usage.
- Behavioral analysis rather than static indicators.
- Validation of real-world exploitability.
- Faster coordination between detection, response, and infrastructure providers.
Ransomware groups are engineering their infrastructure to survive scrutiny, making continuous, context-aware exposure management more important than ever.





