Chinese and Iranian Groups Exploit React and Next.js for Rapid Cloud Access
Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) has confirmed that at least five additional Chinese state-linked hacking groups are actively exploiting the maximum-severity React2Shell remote code execution vulnerability, significantly expanding an already aggressive campaign targeting modern web applications and cloud infrastructure.
Tracked as CVE-2025-55182, React2Shell is an unauthenticated remote code execution flaw in the React open-source JavaScript library. A single crafted HTTP request can allow attackers to execute arbitrary code in React and Next.js applications, enabling direct access to application servers and cloud environments. Early incidents show attackers using this access to steal AWS configuration files, credentials, and other sensitive data, highlighting the immediate risk to organizations running internet-facing React workloads.
Rapid Weaponization and Widespread Breaches
Following public disclosure of the vulnerability on December 3rd, attackers moved with exceptional speed. Palo Alto Networks reported that dozens of organizations were breached within days, with several incidents attributed to Chinese state-backed threat actors. Attackers are leveraging the flaw to execute arbitrary commands and exfiltrate data with a clear focus on cloud infrastructure compromise.
Amazon Web Services also issued an alert confirming that China-linked threat groups Earth Lamia and Jackpot Panda began exploiting React2Shell within hours of disclosure.
The flaw impacts React versions 19.0, 19.1.0, 19.1.1, and 19.2.0, all released within the past year. Multiple packages are vulnerable in default configurations, including react-server-dom-parcel, react-server-dom-turbopack, and react-server-dom-webpack, dramatically increasing the attack surface across modern web stacks.
Five Additional Chinese Espionage Groups Identified
On Saturday, GTIG disclosed that at least five more Chinese cyber-espionage groups have joined the ongoing exploitation campaign. Newly identified groups include:
- UNC6600, deploying the MINOCAT tunneling tool.
- UNC6586, using the SNOWLIGHT downloader.
- UNC6588, delivering the COMPOOD backdoor.
- UNC6603, deploying an updated HISONIC backdoor.
- UNC6595, leveraging the ANGRYREBEL.LINUX remote access trojan.
According to GTIG, the widespread use of React Server Components (RSC) in popular frameworks like Next.js has resulted in a large number of exposed systems. Researchers also observed extensive discussion of CVE-2025-55182 in underground forums, including shared scanning tools, proof-of-concept exploits, and firsthand attack experiences.
Beyond Chinese actors, GTIG noted Iranian threat groups probing the vulnerability, as well as financially motivated attackers deploying XMRig cryptocurrency miners on unpatched systems.
Scale of Exposure Continues to Grow
Internet monitoring organizations have confirmed the massive scope of the issue. Shadowserver is currently tracking more than 116,000 vulnerable IP addresses, with over 80,000 located in the United States alone. GreyNoise observed over 670 unique IPs attempting exploitation in a single 24-hour period, originating from regions including North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific, and China.
The operational impact has already been felt. On December 5th, Cloudflare linked a global website outage to emergency mitigations deployed in response to React2Shell exploitation attempts.
Increasing State-Sponsored Threat Activity
The rapid spread of React2Shell exploitation reflects how quickly state-sponsored threat groups operationalize critical vulnerabilities in widely used technologies. Once disclosed, flaws like this are rapidly shared, weaponized, and deployed across multiple teams to enable large-scale access and intelligence collection.
Public vulnerabilities are a core part of nation-state playbooks, particularly when they provide direct paths into cloud environments and development infrastructure. For defenders, this reinforces the need for continuous exposure validation and rapid remediation, as the window between disclosure and active state-sponsored exploitation is now measured in hours, not weeks.





